Complete text from a FB post that was just reposted on my timeline
"While I feel for the four passengers aboard Titan, the missing submersible, Stockton Rush will get none of my sympathy.
Why?
Glad you asked.
In 2018 OceanGate (aka CEO Stockton Rush) fired David Lochridge. Why? Because Lochridge held a meeting about the
safety concerns
of the Titan.
Lochridge raised concerns about the lack of non-destructive testing of the hull’s experimental design.
This design included a hull that utilized carbon fiber, rather than metallic composition, that would carry passengers to a depth of 4000meters—a depth that has never been reached by an OceanGate manned submersible made of carbon fiber.
Lochridge was told that no testing existed to test the hull for delaminations, porosity or insufficient glue adhesion due to the thickness of the hull and that OceanGate would rely on their own acoustic monitoring system to detect any breakdown of the hull.
Lochridge again raised concerns that the acoustic monitoring system would only warn of submersible failure milliseconds before 𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙖𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙤𝙥𝙝𝙞𝙘 implosion—and would not warn of any flaws in the submersible prior to putting pressure on the hull.
Lochridge was then fired and given 10 minutes to clear out his desk and leave.
Stockton used a viewport on the Titan that the manufacturer only certifies to a pressure of 1300 meters, due to the viewport not being within ‘Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy’ or PVHO standards—knowing he intended to take passengers to 4000meters.
OceanGate -refused- to pay for the manufacturer to build a viewport that would meet the requirements for a depth of 4000meters
After Lochridge’s firing, the Titan was tested at increasing depths, including up to 4000m in the Bahamas. Stockton then admitted that the Titan’s hull showed signs of “cyclic fatigue” and the Titan’s rating was reduced to a maximum of 3000m (not enough to get to the titanic.)
Stockton then claims that “detailed engineering and development work was done under a $5million contract with the University of Washington’s Applied Physics Laboratory.”
But, the University of Washington says their laboratory has never dealt with design nor engineering for the Titan.
On the first dive to the Titanic, in 2021, the submersible encountered a battery issue and had to be manually attached to its lifting platform.
OceanGate decided to cancel the second mission for “repairs and operational enhancements” after the vessel “sustained modest damage to its external components.”
In November 2022, the submersible lost contact with the surface crew for about five hours during his expedition and a mechanical issue forced the vessel to abort after making it 37 feet down.
Most marine operations require charted vessels to be classed by an independent group such as the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), DNV/GL, Lloyd’s Register, etc—Stockton refused.
He refused because classing a vessel can be a multiyear process and didn’t want to “slow his innovation,” because the Titan’s features were outside of preexisting standards.
He also claims that the majority of marine accidents are due to operator error, rather than design. He feels that the classing process is solely to weed out unsatisfactory designs and builders and does nothing to weed out subpar operators.
Also in regards to classing, a letter from the Marine Technology Society, an industry group made up of ocean engineers, technologists, policymakers and educators, was written to OceanGate/Stockton in 2018.
The Marine Technology Society was critical of OceanGate issuing marketing material that stated the Titan design would “meet or exceed the DNV-GL safety standards” while apparently not intending to have the vessel assessed by that same organization.
In its letter, the Marine Technology Society wrote: “We recommend that at a minimum, you institute a prototype testing program that is reviewed and witnessed by DNV-GL.”
OceanGate refused to do so.
How does that account for the company willingly flouting safety standards? I was reading news about aspects of the subs construction not being properly certified. Like the window of the sub not being certified for the depths they were traversing.
From what I understand, submersible vessel certification is voluntary, but if the company wasn't been fully transparent in the wording of the waivers, is that not grounds for a lawsuit?
Something tells me the tourists weren't fully clued in on the sheer degree of danger. It's one thing for OceanGates CEO to fly too close to the sun at his own personal risk, but bringing others to their graves as a result of dubious standards and transparency isn't right.
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